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Abstract
We analyze two cross-country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as
well as a broad range of socio-demographic and other indicators. We  nd that pro-trade prefer-
ences are signi cantly and robustly correlated with an individual’s level of human capital, in the
manner predicted by the factor endowments model. Preferences over trade are also correlated with
the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed: individuals in non-traded
sectors tend to be the most pro-trade, while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative
disadvantage are the most protectionist. Third, an individual’s relative economic status has a
very strong positive association withpro-trade attitudes. Finally, non-economic determinants, in
the form of values, identities, and attachments, play an important role in explaining the variation
in preferences over trade. High degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism/patriotism
are associated withprotectionist tendencies.
c   2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classi cation: F1
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1. Introduction
Economists disagree intensely on many public policy issues. What is the best way to
deal with poverty? What is the appropriate role of the government in providing health
insurance? Is it good anti-trust policy to break up Microsoft? Does counter-cyclical
macroeconomic policy make sense? Should social security be privatized? Should we
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tax international capital  ows? Is the minimum wage desirable? In these and many
other areas, economists are engaged in lively controversies that re ect broader public
debates on social problems.
International trade poses an interesting contrast. Here the debates remain largely
technical, even among policy-oriented economists: Which theory is more appropriate
in explaining the patterns of trade? How much, if at all, has trade contributed to the rise
in the skill premium in the U.S.? Why are “border e ects” so large? On the important
policy questions that excite the public, there is virtually no di erence of views. In
particular, there exists near-universal consensus among mainstream economists on the
desirability of free trade (see for example Alston et al., 1992).
It is striking how little this consensus resonates with public opinion. When asked
about their views on trade, approximately 60% of respondents in opinion polls express
anti-trade views. 1 While there are some interesting di erences across countries, which
we shall document and analyze later, a majority of respondents tend to be in favor
of restricting trade in most countries. Our purpose in this paper is to shed light on
this phenomenon, by undertaking a systematic analysis of individual attitudes towards
trade and their underlying determinants. We make use of two cross-country surveys
of individual opinions. The  rst of these comes from the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP), and it allows us to perform a comparative analysis covering more
than 28,000 individuals in 23 countries. We use as our dependent variable a question
in the ISSP data set that asks whether the respondent favors restricting trade. The data
set also contains a wealthof information on demograph ics, socio-economic status, and
values, which we use to test a number of hypotheses about the formation of attitudes.
To ascertain the robustness of our  ndings, we also run parallel tests whenever possible
with the third wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), which covers a larger sample
of countries.
The standard workhorse models of international trade have well-de ned implications
for the distributive consequences of trade and hence for individual attitudes (see Rodrik
(1995) for a review of the literature). Under the factor-endowments model, which
assumes costless inter-sectoral mobility of productive factors, trade bene ts individuals
who own the factors with which the economy is relatively well endowed, and hurts the
others. This is the well-known Stolper–Samuelson theorem. Under the speci c-factors
model, trade bene ts individuals who are employed in the export-oriented sectors and
hurts those who are employed in the import-competing sectors. To the extent that
individuals are motivated by material self-interest, these models provide important hints
about an individual’s likely attitude to trade depending on his/her factor type or sector
of employment.
Our  rst set of results directly relates to these economic models. Most strikingly,
we  nd strong support for the factor-endowments view of the world in both the
ISSP and WVS data sets. Individuals with higher levels of human capital (proxied by
educational attainment or occupational categories) oppose trade restrictions, but only
in countries that are well endowed with human capital. In the ISSP data set, higher
1 The fraction of individuals who are against trade (i.e., in favor of limiting imports of foreign products)
ranges from 55% in the ISSP data set to 60% in the WVS data set.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1395
levels of education are associated withpro-trade views in advanced countries suchas
Germany and the United States, but with anti-trade views in the Philippines (the poor-
est country in the ISSP sample). We  nd a very similar pattern in the WVS data set,
which has the advantage for this purpose that it covers many more developing coun-
tries (including very poor countries suchas Nigeria and Bangladesh ). Regardless of
whether skill is measured by educational attainment or occupation-based skill levels,
the estimated impact of skill on pro-trade attitudes in the WVS data set is strongly
positive in the richest countries, but weak or negative in the poorest. That individual
trade opinions interact with country characteristics in exactly the manner predicted by
the factor-endowments model in both data sets may be considered surprising, but it is
a robust result and perhaps our strongest single  nding.
We  nd support for the speci c-factors model as well. In particular, individuals em-
ployed in import-competing industries are more likely to be in favor of trade restrictions
(compared to individuals in non-traded sectors). Individuals in export-oriented sectors
are not signi cantly more likely to oppose import restrictions (compared again to indi-
viduals in non-traded sectors). This  nding can be rationalized within the
speci c-factors model by appealing to the presence of intra-industry (two-way) trade
and myopic behavior on the part of individuals in CA sectors (given how the trade
question is phrased in the surveys).
The fact that the factor-endowments and speci c-factors models both  nd support in
the data suggests that individuals may di er in the time horizon they use to evaluate
trade policy. We  nd evidence that some think in terms of the long run (and express
trade opinions in line with the factor-endowments model), while others think in terms
of both the long run and the short run (and express trade opinions in line with both
the factor-endowments and the speci c-factors model).
While the implications of conventional economic models are borne out by the data,
these models go only part of the way in explaining the formation of attitudes. We  nd
that social status, relative incomes, values, and attachments play, if anything, a more
important role. For example, individuals who consider themselves part of the upper
classes tend to be more favorable to trade than those who consider themselves to be
from the lower classes. Individuals with higher relative incomes are more likely to fa-
vor trade than those with low relative incomes. Also, protectionist attitudes go together
witha well-de ned set of normative attributes. Individuals wh o favor trade restrictions
tend to have high attachments to their neighborhood and community, have a high de-
gree of national pride, and believe that national interest should be paramount in making
trade-o s. At the same time, individuals who have con dence in their country’s democ-
racy are less likely to favor trade protection. In other words, communitarian-patriotic
values tend to foster protectionist attitudes, but this tendency is moderated when the
broader institutions of society are perceived to be working well.
Our bottom line is that both economic and non-economic considerations are important
in determining attitudes towards trade. Once we take the myriad factors discussed above
into account, we are reasonably successful in explaining the variation in trade opinions
in our sample. Our preferred “combined” model accounts for about a  fthof th e sample
variance. Moreover, we are also reasonably successful in explaining the di erences in
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why respondents in Poland, for example, are more protectionist on average than those
in Germany.
The empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy is not small,
but it has focused largely on testing the implications of the factor-endowments and
speci c-factors models in a single country. Studies that have found support for the
factor-endowments model include Rogowski (1987, 1989), Midford (1993), Beaulieu
(1996), Balistreri (1997), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 2001b). Studies that have
found support for the speci c-factors model include Magee (1978) and Irwin (1994,
1996). Some have found support for both views of the world (Baldwin and Magee,
1998; Beaulieu and Magee, 2001). Withth e exception of Balistreri (1997) and Scheve
and Slaughter (2001a), none of these studies analyze individual attitudes directly.
Instead they infer trade positions from aggregated information on voting, campaign-
contributions, or policy outcomes. 2
Since we began our work with the ISSP data set we have become aware of two
other related, but independent papers: O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Beaulieu
et al. (2003). Both of these papers only use the ISSP survey to explore the deter-
minants of trade attitudes. Thus, they mainly focus on countries at the high end of the
world income and skill distribution. In addition, neither paper tests the speci c-factors
model. The O’Rourke and Sinnott paper is closest to ours, and many of its conclusions
parallel to our own  ndings.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature within economics that examines sur-
vey data to analyze the formation of individual preferences. See for example Luttmer
(2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) on preferences for redistribution, and
Blanch ower and Oswald (2000) and Alesina et al. (2001) on the determinants of
“happiness”, and Caplan (2001) on the sources of di erences in policy preferences of
the lay public and of economists.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we brie y describe the
data and the methods we have used. Next, we present a series of empirical models
highlighting di erent types of determinants of trade attitudes. In a  nal section, we put
all our results together and comment on the overall  t of our explanatory framework.
2. Description of the data and empirical approach
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) collects cross-national data on
topics that are important for social science research. In this paper we use data from
the 1995 ISSP National Identity module (ISSP). The data set covers information at the
individual level on some 28,456 respondents from 23 countries, including the United
States, Canada, Japan, many Western and Eastern European countries, and one develop-
ing country (the Philippines). 3 For eachindividual, th e data set contains responses on
2 For example, Irwin (1994, 1996) looks at the outcomes of the 1906 and 1923 British general elections
and interprets them as proxies for voters’ opinions on new trade barriers.
3 See Table 1 for the full list of countries. We consider Germany West and East separately, even though
the survey was carried out after their uni cation, in order to see whether there are important di erences
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a variety of topics, ranging from opinions on trade and immigration policy to feelings
of patriotism and regional attachment. In addition, the ISSP data set contains infor-
mation on several economic and demographic variables. Thus the survey allows us to
identify both stated attitudes towards trade and individual characteristics that explain
trade positions in standard economic models. 4
In order to measure individual trade-policy attitudes, we focus on survey answers to
the following question: “Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations be-
tween (respondent’s country) and other countries. How much do you agree or disagree
with the following statement: (Respondent’s country) should limit the import of foreign
products in order to protect its national economy.” 5 After deleting the “can’t choose,
don’t know” and “NA, refused” responses, we transformed survey questions into the
dependent variable Trade Opinion (withanswers ranging from 1 = agree strongly to
5=disagree strongly). Higher values of Trade Opinion therefore correspond to attitudes
that are more pro-trade and less protectionist.
We also created two binary variables, which we label Pro-Trade Dummy and
Against-Trade Dummy. Pro-Trade Dummy is set equal to unity for individuals op-
posing trade protection (i.e., for those replying “disagree” or “disagree strongly” to the
question), and to zero for the rest. Against-Trade Dummy is set equal to unity for in-
dividuals favoring trade protection (i.e., for those replying “agree” or “agree strongly”
to the question), and to zero for the others. 6 Since the results based on Pro-Trade
Dummy and Against-Trade Dummy are very similar to those with the ordered logits
using Trade Opinion, we will present the results based on Pro-Trade Dummy. 7
Table 1 presents summary statistics for Trade Opinion, Pro-Trade Dummy and
Against-Trade Dummy, by country. Several results stand out. First, the ISSP data set
shows that protectionist sentiment runs high on average. Taking the 23 countries as a
whole, more than half of the respondents agree with the proposition that trade should
be restricted (average Against-Trade Dummy =0 :55), while fewer than a quarter dis-
agree (average Pro-Trade Dummy =0 :22). Second, there is quite a large variation
in trade attitudes across countries. Netherlands emerges as the country that is the
most pro-trade (Pro-Trade Dummy =0 :37) while Bulgaria is the most protectionist
(Pro-Trade Dummy =0 :08), regardless of the indicator used. Third, as the last com-
ment indicates, the rankings of the countries are not very sensitive to the measure of
trade attitudes.
Are these  ndings truly re ective of underlying attitudes towards trade? It is well
known that survey responses tend to be highly sensitive to framing – the phrasing of
the question and the context and order in which it is asked. In this particular case, there
4 Since not all questions are covered in individual country surveys, our regressions will typically not
include all 23 countries.
5 The possible answers to this question are as follows: (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor
disagree, (4) disagree, (5) disagree strongly, (8) can’t choose, don’t know, (9) NA, refused.
6 Note that these two alternative formulations of the dependent variable do not require us to drop ob-
servations corresponding to “can’t choose, don’t know” or “NA, refused” answers (which are coded as
zeros).
7 Our results are unchanged when we drop “can’t choose, don’t know” or “NA, refused” observations in































































Summary data on individual attitudes towards trade (ISSP data set)
Country Trade Opinion Average Trade Pro-Trade Against-Trade
Opinion Dummy Dummy
Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree Can’t choose
strongly (2) agree nor (4) strongly (8) NA,
(1) disagree (3) (5) refused (9)
Germany West 0.1513 0.2371 0.1849 0.2683 0.0952 0.0632 2.9134 3 0.3635 2 0.3885 20
Germany East 0.2598 0.3039 0.1699 0.1732 0.0474 0.0458 2.4178 11 0.2206 13 0.5637 13
Great Britain 0.2316 0.4017 0.1853 0.1238 0.0142 0.0435 2.2549 16 0.1380 18 0.6333 10
USA 0.2129 0.4309 0.1602 0.1039 0.0293 0.0629 2.2592 16 0.1331 19 0.6437 9
Austria 0.3784 0.3198 0.1092 0.1261 0.0387 0.0278 2.1021 20 0.1648 15 0.6981 5
Hungary 0.4540 0.2580 0.1580 0.0690 0.0260 0.0350 1.9171 21 0.0950 22 0.7120 3
Italy 0.2578 0.3473 0.1453 0.1609 0.0658 0.0229 2.4163 12 0.2267 11 0.6051 11
Ireland 0.2425 0.4135 0.1087 0.1962 0.0272 0.0121 2.3442 14 0.2233 12 0.6559 7
Netherlands 0.0512 0.2393 0.2824 0.3193 0.0551 0.0527 3.0925 1 0.3743 1 0.2906 23
Norway 0.0910 0.2849 0.2737 0.2279 0.0491 0.0733 2.8481 4 0.2770 5 0.3759 21
Sweden 0.1242 0.2809 0.2924 0.1752 0.0640 0.0633 2.7586 5 0.2392 10 0.4051 19
CzechRepublic 0.2556 0.2655 0.1773 0.1719 0.0954 0.0342 2.5713 8 0.2673 6 0.5212 15
Slovenia 0.2403 0.2683 0.1795 0.2046 0.0396 0.0676 2.5010 9 0.2442 9 0.5087 17
Poland 0.3004 0.3486 0.1270 0.1176 0.0263 0.0801 2.1531 18 0.1439 17 0.6489 8
Bulgaria 0.5357 0.2380 0.0498 0.0326 0.0452 0.0986 1.6837 23 0.0778 23 0.7738 1
Russia 0.3558 0.2448 0.1174 0.1502 0.0681 0.0637 2.2844 15 0.2183 14 0.6006 12
New Zealand 0.1764 0.3423 0.1937 0.1985 0.0499 0.0393 2.5868 7 0.2483 7 0.5187 16
Canada 0.1413 0.3169 0.2158 0.2184 0.0603 0.0473 2.7265 6 0.2787 4 0.4582 18
Philippines 0.1275 0.5375 0.1633 0.1517 0.0083 0.0117 2.3685 13 0.1600 16 0.6650 6
Japan 0.1409 0.1680 0.2954 0.1497 0.1903 0.0557 3.0852 2 0.3400 3 0.3089 22
Spain 0.2121 0.5012 0.1097 0.0925 0.0098 0.0745 2.1212 19 0.1024 21 0.7133 2
Latvia 0.5019 0.2079 0.0987 0.0900 0.0412 0.0603 1.8940 22 0.1312 20 0.7098 4
Slovak Republic 0.2666 0.2875 0.1599 0.1614 0.0857 0.0389 2.4925 10 0.2471 8 0.5540 14
Mean 0.2357 0.3122 0.1780 0.1666 0.0548 0.0526 2.4643 0.2214 0.5480
Standard deviation 0.4245 0.4634 0.3825 0.3727 0.2275 0.2233 1.2021 0.4152 0.4977
Notes: Trade Opinion gives responses to th e following question: “How muchdo you agree or disagree withth e following statement: (respondent’s country)
should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.” The six columns under Trade Opinion present the fraction of individuals
in a country giving each of the six possible answers. Average Trade Opinion is the average of Trade Opinion excluding can’t choose (8) and NA, refused (9)
answers. Pro-Trade Dummy is coded as follows: Pro-Trade Dummy=1 if Trade Opinion=4 or 5; 0 if Trade Opinion=1;2;3;8, or 9. Against-Trade Dummy
is coded as follows: Against-Trade Dummy = 1 if Trade Opinion = 1 or 2; 0 if Trade Opinion = 3;4;5;8, or 9. The second column of each variable gives the
ranking of countries according to that variable. Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values. Mean and standard deviation are across individuals in
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is especially cause to worry because the question in the ISSP survey refers to possi-
ble bene ts of restricting imports (“protecting national economy”) without mentioning
any drawbacks. One would suspect that this imparts a strong protectionist bias to the
responses. There are two countervailing considerations. First, there is ample evidence
from the U.S., which suggests that the precise phrasing of the question on imports
does not greatly a ect the average responses provided (see the review in Scheve and
Slaughter (2001b)). Second, in our empirical work, we will be interested in identify-
ing the determinants of the di erences in attitudes across individuals. Even though the
responses on trade may be biased in one direction, our results will not be a ected as
long as the bias is uniform across individuals (i.e., each individual in a given country
expresses a less pro-trade view than otherwise by an equal amount).
A related question concerns the bias that may arise from the fact that individuals
in the various countries face di erent policy environments and economic contexts.
Cross-country di erences in attitudes towards trade may be shaped by these variations. 8
We will include a full set of country dummies in our regressions to pick up any
spurious correlation between the regressors and the dependent variable. To the extent
that such contextual e ects a ect all individuals in a country in a similar manner, the
country dummies will sweep them up. For example, if a given country is caught in a
recession and respondents tend to be more protectionist than in normal times, this will
be re ected in the estimated coe cient of the country  xed e ect. With few exceptions,
the inclusion of country  xed e ects did not a ect the results. On occasion, there may
be reason to believe that country characteristics will a ect individuals di erentially.
When such concerns arise, we shall also interact relevant country characteristics with
individual attributes.
We might wonder whether protectionist sentiment, as captured by surveys of this
kind, has any relationship to actual trade policies. There are of course good reasons
to believe that in any political system there would be considerable slippage between
individual preferences on any speci c issue and policy outcomes. The “supply” side of
policy can be as important as the “demand” side. Moreover, the institutional structures
of government and of political representation mediate between individual voters and
policy makers (Rodrik, 1995). Nonetheless, it is interesting to know whether trade
attitudes broadly correlate withtrade policies.
Fig. 1 shows that the answer is broadly yes. The correlation between average values
of Trade Opinion and average levels of trade duties across countries is negative and
statistically signi cant (robust t-statistic = −2:13, signi cant at 5% level). 9 The point
estimate suggests that a one-point increase in Trade Opinion on our 5-point scale is
accompanied by a 3.6 percentage point reduction in average duties. At the same time,
it is clear from the  gure that the relationship is quite a loose one: the average values
8 Luttmer (2001), for example, shows that individual preferences for redistribution are shaped in part by
an “exposure” e ect – the extent of welfare recipiency in the respondent’s own community.
9 Trade duties refer to combined import and export duties (tm and tx, respectively) over the 1992–1998
period, calculated as [(1 + tm)∗(1 + tx)] − 1. The source for duties is the World Development Indicators
CD-Rom of the World Bank. Two countries, Slovenia and Slovak Republic, are not included in Fig. 1
because the World Bank does not provide data on duties for them.1400 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
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Fig. 1. Relationship between trade opinion and average trade duties (ISSP data set).
of Trade Opinion accounts for no more than 8 percent of the cross-country variation
in tari s.
As mentioned in the introduction, we use the third wave of the WVS data set
(Inglehart, 1997), carried out in 1995–1997, to complement our  ndings based on
the ISSP data set. While the WVS contains information on trade attitudes for more
countries than the ISSP survey (47 countries, versus 23), its question on trade allows
only a binary response: “Do you think it is better if: (1) Goods made in other countries
can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; or that: (2) There should be
stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country;
or: (9) Don’t Know.” In coding the responses, we followed the same procedures as
withth e ISSP survey. We constructed a binary variable, Pro-Trade Dummy (WVS),
set equal to 1 if the individual answered (1), and equal to 0 if the individual answered
(2) or (9). Missing values (no answer) were kept as missing values. 10 Across countries
that are covered in both the ISSP and WVS data sets, the simple correlation between
average values of pro-trade attitudes is 0.72 (signi cant at the 95% level). 11 One
important shortcoming of the WVS is that it does not contain the information that
would allow the matching of respondents to sectors of employment in the way that the
ISSP data set does. This means that we cannot use the WVS for purposes of testing
the implications of the speci c-factors model.
10 We found that our analysis remains una ected if we count “don’t knows” as missing values instead.
11 See Tables 2 and 3 for summary statistics of Pro-Trade Dummy (WVS) and for a comparison of the
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Table 2
Summary data on individual attitudes towards trade (WVS)
Country Pro-Trade Country Pro-Trade
Dummy (WVS) Dummy (WVS)
Uruguay 0.0720 S. Korea 0.3483
Venezuela 0.1209 Bulgaria 0.3517
Brazil 0.1297 Switzerland 0.3639
Argentina 0.1395 Germany East 0.3647
Mexico 0.1523 Macedonia 0.3697
Peru 0.1528 Finland 0.3850
India 0.1667 Sweden 0.4143
Turkey 0.1747 Estonia 0.4251
Bangladesh0.1856 Taiwan 0.4554
Pakistan 0.1951 Latvia 0.4583
Puerto Rico 0.2109 Croatia 0.4676
Chile 0.2170 Norway 0.4685
Poland 0.2350 Bosnia 0.4700
Australia 0.2366 Nigeria 0.4745
China 0.2414 Serbia 0.4922
Dominican Republic 0.2566 Armenia 0.5075
Spain 0.2601 Ukraine 0.5240
USA 0.2705 Azerbaijan 0.5280
Philippines 0.2833 Belarus 0.5378
Lithuania 0.2864 Germany West 0.5428
Slovenia 0.2982 Georgia 0.5547
Russia 0.3034 Montenegro 0.5708




Notes: Trade Opinion (WVS) gives responses to the following question: “Do you think it is better if:
1. Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; or that: 2.
There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country;
or: 9. Don’t Know.” Pro-Trade Dummy (WVS) is coded as follows: Pro-Trade Dummy (WVS)=1 if Trade
Opinion (WVS) = 1; 0 if Trade Opinion (WVS) = 2 or 9.
In most of our tests, we shall use Pro-Trade Dummy from the ISSP data set and
Pro-Trade Dummy (WVS) from the WVS as our dependent variables and estimate a
series of probit models. We have checked the robustness of our results to alternative
econometric models, estimating ordered logit speci cations as well as OLS regressions
with Trade Opinion as the dependent variable. We  nd very few substantive di erences
so we shall not present the results from these di erent speci cations. 12 When we
present probit results, we report the marginal e ect of each variable, i.e. the estimated
change in the probability of being pro-trade (“disagree” and “disagree strongly” with
trade restrictions) given a marginal increase in the value of the relevant regressor,
12 See the working paper version (NBER Working Paper 8461) for ordered-logit results.1402 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
Table 3
Comparison between ISSP and WVS data sets













Germany West 0.5428 0.3635
Japan 0.7170 0.3400
Notes: In bothdata sets, Pro-Trade Dummy is set equal to 1 if an individual is in favor of imports, 0 if
he is not in favor of imports. The correlation coe cient between the country average values of Pro-Trade
Dummy in the two data sets is 0.7226, signi cant at the 5% level (only countries for which data is available
in bothdata sets were considered).
holding all other regressors at their mean value. These marginal e ects represent the
estimated impact that each regressor has on the probability that an “average” individual
will be pro-trade. 13
3. A  rst pass: The na   ve demographic model
As a  rst pass through the data, we ignore economic theory and present some es-
timates that relate trade attitudes to a list of standard demographic characteristics. We
use information from ISSP questions regarding age, gender, citizenship, years of edu-
cation, real income, area of residence (rural vs. urban), subjective social class, trade
union membership, and political party a liation. 14 The results are shown in the  rst
two columns of Table 4. The WVS data yield very similar results, which we do not
present to save space. 15
We  nd evidence of a strong gender e ect on trade attitudes, which survives vir-
tually all speci cations we have tried. Column (1) in Table 4 shows that being male
increases the probability of replying either “disagree” or “disagree strongly” with trade
restrictions by 7.7 percentage points (signi cant at the 1% level). This is quite a
13 As is mentioned above, in eachspeci cation we include a full set of country dummy variables th at
capture unobserved additive country-speci c e ects. We also cluster standard errors by country, to account
for correlation across individuals within the same country.
14 See de nitions of variables at the end of Table 4.
15 Some control variables are de ned di erently in regressions using the WVS due to di erences in the
questions posed: country of birth (in WVS) instead of citizenship (in ISSP), highest education level attained































































Factor endowments model (ISSP data set)
Probit withcountry dummy variables 123456789
Dependent variable Pro-trade dummy
Age −0:0008 −0:0007 −0:0008 −0:0008 −0:0005 −0:0010 −0:0010 −0:0007 −0:0008
0.0004+ 0.0006 0.0004+ 0.0005+ 0.0004 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0005 0.0004+
Male 0.0766 0.0688 0.0760 0.0801 0.0950 0.0719 0.0719 0.0730 0.0734
0.0087** 0.0151** 0.0092** 0.0089** 0.0077** 0.0089** 0.0089** 0.0098** 0.0093**
Citizen −0:0751 −0:2003 −0:0743 −0:0769 −0:1146 −0:0819 −0:0819 −0:0652 −0:0662
0.0332* 0.0423** 0.0328* 0.0337* 0.0381** 0.0323* 0.0322* 0.0329* 0.0325*
Education (years of education) 0.0200 0.0157 −0:1157 −0:0766 −0:1086 −0:0966 −0:0963 −0:1207 −0:1142
0.0024** 0.0031** 0.0308** 0.0206** 0.0534* 0.0308** 0.0335** 0.0384** 0.0327**
Education∗gdp 0.0142 0.0102 0.0135 0.0121 0.0120 0.0146 0.0140
0.0032** 0.0021** 0.0054* 0.0032** 0.0035** 0.0039** 0.0033**
Log of real income 0.0380 0.0542 0.0478
0.0115** 0.0070** 0.1305








Upper social class 0.0314
0.0059**
Trade union member −0:0110
0.0207
Political a liation with the right 0.0375
0.0122**
Number obs 24025 4834 24025 22874 18719 16611 16611 21692 23023
Pseudo R
2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Notes: The table contains the estimated marginal e ect on the probability of being pro-trade, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at
their mean value. The standard errors of the marginal e ect of each relevant regressor – adjusted for clustering on country – are presented under each marginal e ect. + signi cant
at 10%; * signi cant at 5%; ** signi cant at 1%. In regression (4) we drop the Philippines. In regressions (5), we drop low-income countries (Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia
and the Philippines). Pro-Trade Dummy is coded as follows: Pro-Trade Dummy = 1 if Trade Opinion = 4 or 5; 0 if Trade Opinion = 1;2;3;8, or 9. Education refers to years
of education, witha maximum top-coding (introduced by us) of 20 : gdp is the log of per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars). Rural is coded as follows:
1 = urban, 2 = suburbs=city-town, 3 = rural. Log of real income is calculated using data in local currency on individual yearly income from the ISSP data set and purchasing power
parity conversion factors from the WDI (World Bank). import duties are average import duties (as % of imports) in 1990–1995. imports/gdp is the average imports-to-GDP ratio
in 1990–1995. Upper social class is coded as follows: 1 = lower, 2 = working, 3 = lower middle, 4 = middle, 5 = upper middle, 6 = upper. Trade union member equals 1 if the
individual is a member of a trade union, 0 if he is not. Political a liation with the right is coded as follows: 1 = far left, 2 = centre left, 3 = centre, 4 = right, 5 = far right.1404 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
striking di erence given that only 22% of the ISSP sample overall is pro-trade. This
gender-based di erence in trade attitudes provides us withan early glimpse into th e
important role played by values in shaping attitudes. 16 Older individuals appear to
be more protectionist, but the estimates are not always signi cant. 17 Citizenship in the
country is negatively associated withpro-trade sentiments, wh ile political a liation
with the right has a positive and signi cant impact on pro-trade attitudes. 18 Finally,
self-evaluations of high social status (upper social class) have a positive e ect on
pro-trade attitudes, i.e. individuals who identify themselves as belonging to one of the
upper classes are more likely to oppose protection.
Column (2) in Table 4 shows that an individual’s real income is positively asso-
ciated withpro-trade attitudes, even after controlling for education and oth er socio-
demographic attributes. Given that a full set of country dummy variables is included in
the speci cation, this marginal e ect captures the impact of the variation of individual
income within each country, i.e. the e ect of relative income. Thus trade is generally
perceived to be a good thing for individuals at the high end of a country’s income
distribution, and a bad thing for those at the bottom. This result survives various ro-
bustness checks, including embedding the income variable in the economic frameworks
we discuss below. We are not aware of any simple economic theory that would ex-
plain this  nding, and we leave the development of such a theory to further research.
Whatever the underlying story, one interesting implication of the relationship between
relative income and pro-trade attitudes is worthnoting. Consider a political-economy
model in which trade policies are determined by the preferences of the median voter
(as in Mayer, 1984). In countries withgreater income inequality th e median voter will
normally have a lower relative income than in countries with greater equality. Con-
sequently, greater inequality will be associated with higher levels of trade protection
across countries.
When we modify the na   ve demographics speci cation below, we shall drop some
of the socio-demographic variables (area of residence, subjective social class, political
party a liation and trade union membership) because we would be losing too many
observations to missing values otherwise. We shall keep age, gender, citizenship and
education as controls in all speci cations.
4. Economic determinants of individual attitudes: The factor-endowments model
Moving towards free trade, a country that is well endowed with skilled labor will
experience an increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods and correspond-
16 An alternative hypothesis is that gender di erences arise from the signi cantly lower levels of
labor-market participation of women or from di erences in the labor-market positions of women relative
to men. We do not  nd evidence of such e ects when we control for whether an individual is in the la-
bor market or not, or when we control for comparative-advantage (comparative-disadvantage) status of the
individual’s sector of employment.
17 We do not  nd evidence of non-linear e ects of age on pro-trade attitudes.
18 Trade union membership is associated with protectionist attitudes, but the e ect is not signi cant in the
simple probit speci cation.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1405
ingly specialize in the production of those goods. According to the Stolper–Samuelson
theorem, skilled workers in all sectors of the economy will gain and unskilled workers
will lose. A key assumption of the factor-endowments model – of which the Stolper–
Samuelson theorem is an implication – is that factors of production can move costlessly
across economic sectors. This is an extreme assumption. However, as long as the time
horizon individuals use to evaluate trade policy is a long-run one – in which rates of
return to factors are equalized across sectors – their attitudes over trade policy will be
informed by the underlying logic of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. In this section,
we test this idea.
We  rst focus on the analysis of the ISSP data set. We use as our theoretical back-
drop a world in which skilled and unskilled labor are the only relevant factors of
production. We do not have information on capital ownership, so we shunt it aside
by assuming that it plays an insigni cant role in shaping comparative advantage, per-
haps because it is internationally mobile. Our measure of skill is years of education
(education), which we have already used above.
According to the factor-endowments model, an individual’s trade policy attitudes
will depend both on his skill level and on his country’s relative factor endowment. A
skilled individual will be pro-trade in an economy that is well endowed with skilled
labor, but anti-trade in an economy that is well endowed with low-skill labor. So we
need information also on an economy’s relative abundance in skilled labor. As a proxy
for relative factor endowments, we shall use per-capita GDP (in 1995, PPP-adjusted).
Table 14 in Appendix B presents per capita GDP values for the countries included in
the two data sets. It is reasonable to suppose that countries with higher values of GDP
per capita are also better endowed withskilled labor. 19
Before we present regression results, it is instructive to examine whether the es-
timated e ect of education varies systematically across countries in the manner pre-
dicted by the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. So we  rst ran a series of probit regressions
on individual countries, with Pro-Trade Dummy as the dependent variable. In each
case, we regressed Pro-Trade Dummy on education (along with age and male). In
Fig. 2a, we plot the estimated marginal e ects we obtained on education alongside
each country’s per-capita GDP. The result is striking: there is a very strong and tight
relationship between a country’s per-capita GDP and the magnitude of the correspond-
ing estimated marginal e ect of education (the coe cient of per capita GDP is 1.53
percentage points per US$10,000, robust t-statistic=4:97, signi cant at 1% level). The
richer a country, the more positive is the impact of a marginal increase of education
on the probability of pro-trade attitudes. The Philippines lies at the low end of the
spectrum, and is without question the country with the lowest skill endowment in the
ISSP sample. The marginal e ect of education we obtained for the Philippines is not
only the smallest among all countries in the ISSP data set, it is actually negative (and
19 We could have also used the Barro and Lee (1996,2000) data sets, but these su er from some clear
defects where the countries in our sample are concerned. For example, when we construct a measure of
relative human capital endowment (high-skilled vs low-skilled labor) by considering no schooling and pri-
mary schooling attainment in the low-skilled labor measure and secondary schooling and higher schooling
attainment in the high-skilled labor measure, we obtain that West Germany and Spain rank lower than the
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Fig. 2. Relationship between per-capita GDP and the estimated marginal e ect of: (a) education on pro-trade
attitudes (ISSP data set) and, (b) occupational skill on pro-trade attitudes (WVS data set).
statistically signi cant at the 1% level). Greater education is associated with more pro-
tectionist views in the Philippines – the only such case in the ISSP sample. These
 ndings are quite in line with the Stolper–Samuelson theorem.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1407
In columns (3)–(9) of Table 4 we show pooled regressions, with a full set of country
dummies, where we take into account the cross-country heterogeneity with respect to
the e ect of education. In regression (3), we interact education withlog per-capita
GDP, education∗gdp, and enter the main e ect of education separately. 20 The previous
exercise on individual countries suggests that the impact of education should depend on
the level of per-capita GDP; that is, we should get a negative coe cient on education
but a positive coe cient on the interaction term education∗gdp. This is exactly what we
get. 21 Both terms are highly signi cant. Columns (4) and (5) con rm that the pattern
continues to hold when we drop the Philippines and the other lower-income countries
from the sample. 22 This is important evidence, suggesting that the non-linearity in
education is present for the entire range of countries; it is not an artifact driven by
either the Philippines or a small number of low-income countries. Column (6) con rms
that the result is robust to controlling for an individual’s real income. Finally, in
regression (7), we introduce an additional interaction term between individual income
and per-capita GDP, log of real income∗gdp, to con rm that what we are capturing is
a non-linearity in the impact of education, and not with respect to income/earnings.
We also take into consideration the possibility that di erent levels of trade policy
may a ect individuals within a country not uniformly. In particular, international dif-
ferences in trade openness may impact the interaction coe cient of individual skill and
country factor-endowments. We are worried about the possibility that richer countries
are more open to trade and that the distributive implications are therefore more evi-
dent there. To guard against this, we interact education withbotha country’s average
import-tari  level and its import/GDP ratio (columns (8) and (9), Table 4). However,
we  nd that the coe cients on these interaction terms, which are insigni cant, are not
supportive of this possibility. And more important, in neither case are the  ndings on
the Stolper–Samuelson e ect altered. 23
Since the WVS covers more countries, including many more low-income countries,
it is important to check whether these results carry over to the WVS data set. This
is done in Table 5. The WVS allows us to use four di erent measures of skill: the
highest education level attained by the individual (education), the age at which the
individual  nished school (education age), the skill of the individual according to
an occupation-based classi cation (individual skill), and the skill of the chief wage
earner in the household according to the same occupation-based classi cation (cwe
skill). Depending on the measure of skill used, the number of countries included is
either 37 or 40, which is a signi cant improvement over 23. As before, we use the
log of per capita GDP (in 1995, PPP-adjusted) to measure eachcountry’s endowment
of skilled labor.
Table 5 reveals the same non-linear pattern with respect to the impact of skill
on pro-trade attitudes that we uncovered with the ISSP data set. Regardless of the
20 Notice that the main e ect of per capita GDP is captured by the country dummy variables.
21 O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) have independently replicated this result, even though their measure of skill
is di erent from ours. These authors use an occupational measure, in contrast to our educational measure.
22 The countries dropped are Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia and the Philippines.
23 Regressions (7) and (8) in Table 5 show parallel results using the WVS data: again, the  ndings of the































































Factor endowments model (WVS data set)
Probit withcountry dummies 12345678
Dependent variable Pro-Trade Dummy (WVS)
Age −0:003 −0:0026 −0:0039 −0:0034 −0:004 −0:0034 −0:0025 −0:003
0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0001**
Male 0.0365 0.0721 0.0385 0.0344 0.044 0.0239 0.0464 0.037
0.0043** 0.0078** 0.0046** 0.0047** 0.0050** 0.0072** 0.0049** 0.0043**
Country of birth −0:0463 −0:1037 −0:0469 −0:0419 −0:0535 −0:0294 −0:0767 −0:0418
0.0094** 0.0159** 0.0099** 0.0101** 0.0103** 0.0152+ 0.0116** 0.0095**
Education (educational attainment) −0:1004 −0:1399 −0:1184 −0:106
0.0090** 0.0248** 0.0166** 0.0096**
Education∗gdp 0.014 0.0185 0.0156 0.0143
0.0011** 0.0026** 0.0018** 0.0011**
Education age −0:0232 −0:057
(age at which education completed) 0.0043** 0.0054**
Education age∗gdp 0.0031 0.0077
0.0005** 0.0006**
Individual skill −0:0831
(occupation-based individual skill) 0.0086**
Individual skill∗gdp 0.0115
0.0010**








Number obs 50771 15166 46143 44495 40068 22962 35413 49789
Pseudo R
2 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.09 0.1
Notes: The table contains the estimated marginal e ect on the probability of being pro-trade, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at
their mean value. The standard errors of the marginal e ect of each relevant regressor – adjusted for clustering on country – are presented under each marginal e ect. + signi cant at
10%; ** signi cant at 1%. Education (the highest education level attained by the individual) is coded as follows: 1=no formal education; 2=incomplete primary school; 3=complete
primary school; 4=incomplete secondary school (technical/vocational type); 5=complete secondary school (technical/vocational type); 6=incomplete secondary (university/preparatory
type); 7=complete secondary (university/preparatory type); 8=some university-level education, without degree; 9=university level education, withdegree. Education age is the age
at which the individual  nished school. Individual skill is coded as follows: 1 = agricultural worker; 2 = farmer (own farm); 3 = unskilled manual worker; 4 = semi-skilled manual
worker; 5 = skilled manual worker; 6 = foreman and supervisor; 7 = non manual-o ce worker (non-supervisory); 8 = supervisory-o ce worker; 9 = professional worker (lawyer,
accountant, teacher, etc.); 10 = employer=manager of establishment with less than 10 employees; 11 = employer=manager of establishment with 10 or more employees. cwe (chief
wage earner in the household) skill is coded in the same way as individual skill. Regression (2) is the same as (1) but it only considers observations from the countries in common
between the ISSP and the WVS data sets (see Table 3). Regression (4) is the same as regression (3) but it excludes individuals who  nished school when they were more than 30
years old. import duties are average import duties (as % of imports) in 1990–1995. imports/gdp is the average imports-to-GDP ratio in 1990–1995.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1409
measure of skill used, the estimated marginal e ect of skill is negative (and signif-
icant), while the estimated marginal e ect of skill interacted with per-capita GDP is
positive (and also signi cant). As we did with the ISSP data, we also plot the estimated
marginal e ect of individual skill against a country’s per-capita GDP. Fig. 2b shows the
scatter plot for the occupation-based skill measure (the others are quite similar). The
relationship has a distinctly positive slope: the associated regression slope has a robust
t-statistic of 3.85. The poorest countries in the sample – Bangladesh, Nigeria, Armenia,
Georgia – are those where more skill is associated with less pro-trade views. None of
the richer countries exhibits this reversal.
Overall, these  ndings are strikingly supportive of the implications of the factor-
endowments model and of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. Education and skill are
very strongly correlated withsupport for free trade in countries th at are well endowed
with human capital. It is either weakly or negatively correlated with support for free
trade in countries that are poorly endowed with human capital. No other theory that we
are aware of can explain this pattern. In particular, these  ndings are hard to square
with the hypothesis that better educated people prefer more trade simply because they
have a better understanding of comparative advantage or because they get more out of
contact withforeign countries/products.
5. Economic determinants of individual attitudes: The speci c-factors model
If individuals are on average immobile across industries, attitudes towards trade
should be determined by their sector of employment, rather than their factor type.
Respondents working in sectors where the home economy has a comparative advan-
tage should be pro-trade; respondents employed in comparative-disadvantage sectors
should be protectionist; and individuals in non-traded sectors on balance indi erent or
pro-trade. This is the central insight of the speci c-factors model.
In taking this insight to our data, we face an immediate problem. The ISSP sur-
vey contains no direct question about sector of employment. But it does provide very
detailed information on occupation (based on the 4-digit International Standard Clas-
si cation of Occupations [ISCO] or national classi cations). We do our best to infer
sector of employment from this data on occupation. Since our goal is to establish
a correspondence between these sectors and international trade data, we recode the
occupation variables according to the industry classi cation used in the World Trade
Analyzer (WTA) data set. In particular, we end up reorganizing the data on the basis
of a breakdown into 34 manufacturing industries (plus one – non-manufacturing) as
de ned by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Since the occupation codes
used in the ISSP data set are not always detailed enough to be matched with any sin-
gle BEA code, we create in addition new codes as combinations of the original codes.
This results in a total of 54 (partly overlapping) sectors. The details of our proce-
dures and the sectoral breakdown we use are discussed in Appendix A. In some cases,
the mapping is straightforward, as many occupational codes (e.g., “dairy and livestock
producers”, “chemical-processing-plant operators”, or “aircraft engine mechanics and
 tters”) are directly indicative of sectors. In other cases, it is impossible to assign an1410 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
individual to a speci c sector, and this results in either a less precise recoding or in
missing values.
We determine a sector’s revealed comparative advantage (or comparative disadvan-
tage) by looking at the sign of adjusted net imports in that sector (averaged over the
years 1990–1995). The adjustment is meant to “correct” for the existence of overall
trade imbalances. Hence, we de ne an adjustment factor,  , as follows:
  =





The indicator   is positive for countries that have a trade de cit and negative for
countries witha trade surplus. In particular,   tells us by what fraction imports in each
sector would have to be reduced in order to balance the trade account. Our measure
of adjusted net imports in eachsector is th e di erence between (1 − )Mi and Xi.W e
then de ne the two sector-speci c variables, CAik (comparative-advantage sector) and
CDik (comparative-disadvantage sector) for eachsector i in country k as follows:
CAik =

1; if Mik −Xik − Mik¡0; for sectorik =1;:::;54;
0; if Mik −Xik − Mik¿0; for sectorik =1;:::;54 or if non-tradable sector;
CDik =

1; if Mik −Xik − Mik¿0; for sectorik =1;:::;54;
0; if Mik −Xik − Mik¡0; for sectorik =1;:::;54 or if non-tradable sector:
A sector is de ned as a comparative-advantage sector if its adjusted net imports are
less than zero and as a comparative-disadvantage sector if its adjusted net imports
are greater than zero. Each individual is therefore assigned to one of three types of
sectors: (a) a comparative-advantage sector; (b) a comparative-disadvantage sector; or
(c) a non-tradable sector. 24
The sector classi cation based on the occupation variables delivers a fairly good mea-
sure of the comparative-advantage (comparative-disadvantage) status of each individual.
We use external data from another ISSP data set, Social Inequality II (1992), which
contains information on bothindividuals’ sector of employment and occupation for th e
United States, Germany, and Austria. For approximately 85% of individuals in these
three countries for whom both sector and occupation data is available, our reclassi ca-
tion on the occupation data produces the same information on comparative-advantage
and comparative-disadvantage status as if direct data on sector had been used. 25
The  rst regression in Table 6 shows the results of our test of the sector-speci c
model. An individual in a comparative-disadvantage sector is signi cantly less likely
to be pro-trade (by 2.5 percentage points), compared to an individual in a non-traded
sector. This is highly supportive of the speci c-factors model. Perhaps surprisingly, an
individual in a comparative-advantage industry is not more likely to be pro-trade than
24 This is true unless the individual has not reported his occupation or there is no data on imports and
exports for his sector of employment, in which case the individual is assigned a missing value.
25 A separate appendix describing this analysis along with the analysis of attenuation bias arising from
misclassi cation (see Card, 1996) is available upon request. We thank J  orn-Ste en Pischke and an anonymous
referee for suggestions that prompted these analyses.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1411
Table 6
Sector speci c model (ISSP data set)
Probit withcountry dummy variables
12 34 5
Dependent variable Pro-Trade Dummy
Age −0:0004 −0:0004 −0:0005 −0:0005 −0:0004
0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005
Male 0.0802 0.0805 0.0811 0.0808 0.0846
0.0129** 0.0125** 0.0130** 0.0128** 0.0131**
Citizen −0:0695 −0:0691 −0:068 −0:0678 −0:0693
0.0390+ 0.0387+ 0.0396+ 0.0392+ 0.0413+
Education (years of education) 0.019 0.0189 −0:1332 −0:1303 −0:124
0.0028** 0.0030** 0.0238** 0.0254** 0.0241**
Education∗gdp 0.016 0.0157 0.0154
0.0025** 0.0027** 0.0026**
CA sector −0:0133 −0:0207 0.0115
0.0239 0.0187 0.0358






Education∗willingness to move −0:0336
0.0308
Education∗gdp∗willingness to move 0.0027
0.003
Willingness to move 0.126
0.0671+
CA∗willingness to move −0:0454
0.0574
CD∗willingness to move 0.002
0.0449
Number of obs 12432 12432 12432 12432 11473
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Notes: The table contains the estimated marginal e ect on the probability of being pro-trade, given an
increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value. The standard
errors of the marginal e ect of each relevant regressor – adjusted for clustering on country – are presented
under eachmarginal e ect. + signi cant at 10%; * signi cant at 5%; ** signi cant at 1%. Pro-Trade Dummy
is coded as follows: Pro-Trade Dummy=1 if Trade Opinion=4 or 5; 0 if Trade Opinion=1;2;3;8, or 9. gdp
is the log of per capita GDP in 1995, PPP (current international dollars). Willingness to move, which varies
between 0 and 1, measures the stated willingness to move to another city/town, in order to improve work
or living conditions. A sector is de ned as a CA (comparative-advantage) sector if its adjusted net imports
are less than zero and as a CD (comparative-disadvantage) sector if its adjusted net imports are greater than
zero. Exports refers to the value of exports in the respondent’s sector of employment, normalized by GDP.
Imports refers to the value of imports in the respondent’s sector of employment, normalized by GDP.1412 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
an individual in a non-traded sector: the marginal e ect of CA sector is negative but
not signi cant. 26
The latter result can be rationalized by considering the original survey question,
which is meant to elicit attitudes related to restrictions on imports only. In the presence
of two-way (intra-industry) trade, myopic individuals may oppose import restrictions
in their sectors, even when those sectors are large exporters on balance. Additionally,
our sectoral classi cation and aggregation procedures may have resulted in the lumping
together of comparative-advantage and comparative-disadvantage sectors. Whatever the
reason, the bottom line that emerges from this regression is that the main cleavage in
preference formation over trade lies not between the two tradable sectors but between
tradables and non-tradables.
An alternative speci cation, which takes into account the presence of two-way trade,
is shown in column (2). Now we enter separately the actual volumes of exports and
imports (normalized by GDP) of the sector in which an individual is employed. The
logic of the speci c-factors model (augmented by the possibility of two-way trade) is
that the estimated coe cient on imports should be negative. The estimated coe cient
on exports should be positive to the extent that individuals fear retaliation from abroad
or see through the Lerner symmetry theorem. We do indeed  nd the negative (and
signi cant) e ect on the imports term. The estimated coe cient on exports, however,
is insigni cant. We interpret this as mildly supportive of the speci c-factors model.
In columns (3) and (4), we carry out a joint test of the factor-endowments and
speci c-factors models. Both models survive, though the signi cance level of the
comparative-disadvantage variable drops to 10%. We also compare the two competing
models, in their linear speci cation, using a non-nested test, the J test proposed by
Davidson and MacKinnon (Greene, 1997, p. 365). First, we estimate the two models
separately: we regress Trade Opinion on age, gender and citizenship plus, respectively,
education and education∗gdp (for the factor-endowments model) and CA sector and
CD sector (for the speci c-factors model). Next, we augment each of the two spec-
i cations with the  tted values from the other model. We  nd that the coe cients
on the  tted values are signi cant in both cases (but only at the 10% level for the
speci c-factors  tted values). 27 Thus, the results based on the non-nested test – in
favor of the factor-endowments model and marginally in favor of the sector-speci c
model – are consistent withwh at we found in column (3), Table 6.
It is important to emphasize that our analysis of misclassi cation – due to the use
of the occupation-based sector classi cation – suggests that the attenuation factors of
the speci c-factors coe cients are of a very small magnitude (approximately 0.5).
This implies that the coe cients of CA sector and CD sector could be substantially
underestimated.
26 In the ordered logit results, using as a common benchmark individuals in non-traded sectors, respon-
dents in comparative-disadvantage industries are on average less likely to be pro-trade than respondents in
export-oriented sectors: the coe cients on CA sector and CD sector are signi cantly di erent at the 10%
level.
27 In particular, we  nd that H0: factor-endowments model should be rejected in favor of H1: sector-speci c
model at a 90% level of signi cance. When we reverse the roles of H0 and H1, we  nd that H0: sector-speci c
model should be rejected in favor of H1: factor-endowments model at a 99% level of signi cance.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1413
The horse-race analysis between the factor-endowments model and the speci c-factors
model gives us information regarding the time-horizon individuals use to assess trade
policy, i.e. whether they are thinking about the long-run (as in the factor-endowments
model) or the short-run (as in the speci c-factors model) or both. The variation across
individuals in terms of the relative importance of the two time frameworks is likely to
depend on mobility. A plausible interpretation is that a certain fraction of individuals
in our sample view themselves as intersectorally mobile over the time horizon that is
relevant to them, and a certain fraction think of themselves as stuck in their present
line of employment. The  rst group’s trade attitudes would be in accordance with the
factor-endowments model, while the second group’s attitudes would be in accordance
withbothth e speci c-factors model and th e factor-endowments model. 28
The ISSP data set contains some questions on mobility. In particular, individuals are
asked: “If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling
would you be to move to another town or city?” Answers to the questions range
from “very unwilling” (1) to “very willing” (5). The question relates to geographical
mobility rather than inter-sectoral mobility, but may still be indicative of the latter.
This gives us an opportunity to check whether willingness to move relates to trade
attitudes in the manner consistent with our interpretation.
Our discussion suggests a speci cation of the form E +( 1− mobile)∗S, where E
are the regressors that capture the factor-endowments model, and S are the regressors
re ecting the speci c-factors model (we include the education main e ect as part of
the E set). If we estimate a regression withall th e main e ects ( E, S and mobile) and
interactions (E∗mobile and S∗mobile), we should  nd that the coe cient on E∗mobile
is not signi cant and that the coe cients on S and S∗mobile are equal in absolute value
and with opposite signs. According to this model, the coe cient on the main e ect
mobile should not be signi cant. However, we would not be surprised to  nd a positive
coe cient, since high mobility allows more  exibility in terms of other side-e ects of
trade liberalization not analyzed in the paper. 29 We test these restrictions in regression
(5), Table 6.
First, the sign on the comparative advantage variable (CA sector) now becomes
positive, in line with the original expectations from the speci c-factors model (but the
marginal e ect is insigni cant). Second, individuals in comparative-advantage sectors
are less pro-trade (but not signi cantly) if their willingness to move is high. Third,
individuals in comparative-disadvantage sectors express less protectionist sentiments
when their stated willingness to move is high, although the interaction term in this case
is nowhere near signi cant. 30 These results are all consistent with our interpretation,
28 The implicit assumption is that the economy behaves as in the speci c-factors model in the short-run
(i.e., the average mobility rate is low in the short run) and as in the factor-endowments model in the long-run
(i.e., the average mobility rate is high in the long run). A mobile individual is not concerned about the short
run, because he can move from sector to sector, but he cares about the long run.
29 For example, trade liberalization may a ect the value of assets in a certain area.
30 Notice that the marginal e ects of CA sector and CA∗ willingness to move, in absolute value, are not
signi cantly di erent from each other. The same is true for the marginal e ects of CD sector and CD∗
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but the insigni cance of the estimates prevents us from reading too much support into
them.
6. The role of values, identity, and attachments
We have drawn attention to the importance of non-economic determinants of trade
attitudes in the introduction. Indeed, some of our most interesting results pertain to the
role of values, identity, and attachments in shaping individual attitudes on trade policy.
These attributes are particularly signi cant in explaining di erences in average trade
attitudes across countries. We consider three di erent speci cations in Table 7.
First, we look at the impact of community and regional attachments (column (1)).
We focus on answers to the following questions: “How close do you feel to re-
spondent’s neighborhood?” (neighborhood attachment); respondent’s town/city?” (town
attachment); respondent’s county/region?” (county attachment); respondent’s coun-
try?” (national pride (1)); respondent’s continent?” (continent attachment). 31 The
results show a clear pattern. Individuals with strong attachments to their neighborhood,
county/region, or nation tend to be less pro-trade. 32 The second set of issues we look
at relates directly to patriotism, nationalism, and chauvinism. In addition to national
pride (1), we focus on the following questions: “How much do you agree or disagree
with the following statements? I would rather be a citizen of respondent’s country
than of any other country in the world.” (national pride (2)); Generally respondent’s
country is a better country than most other countries.” (national pride (3)); respon-
dent’s country should follow its own interests, even if this leads to con icts with other
nations.” (national pride (4)). 33 On the one hand, national pride entails feelings of
patriotism, i.e. genuine attachment to one’s own country. On the other, national pride
can be associated withfeelings of nationalism – or, in its extreme form, ch auvinism
– i.e. sentiments of superiority of one’s own country (Smithand Jarkko, 1998 ). We
interpret answers to national pride (1) and (2) as re ecting bothfeelings of patriotism
and nationalism. National pride (3) matches perfectly Smithand Jarkko’s (1998) def-
inition of nationalism as a feeling of superiority of one’s own country. National pride
(4) applies this nationalistic stand to a practical situation.
In a world where there are gains from trade at the national level, we would expect
patriotism to be positively correlated withpro-trade attitudes. Regardless of distribu-
tional implications, individuals who care about the country as a whole should be in
favor of free trade. On the other hand, patriotic individuals might lean towards protec-
tion if trade is viewed as a zero-sum game between nations or its social consequences
are judged as adverse. The results in column (2) of Table 7 are more in line with
the latter interpretation. There is a particularly strong negative relationship between
31 The four possible answers to these questions range from “not close at all” (1) to “very close” (4).
32 Suchattach ments tend to be particularly strong in countries like Japan and Spain, and weak in Britain
and the U.S. (see Table 12 in Appendix B).
33 The  ve possible answers to these questions range from “disagree strongly” (1) to “agree strongly” (5).A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1415
Table 7
Community/national attachment model (ISSP data set)
Probit withcountry dummy variables
1234
Dependent variable Pro-Trade Dummy
Age −0:0003 −0:0001 −0:0007 0.0001
0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004
Male 0.0805 0.0832 0.0785 0.088
0.0089** 0.0097** 0.0081** 0.0089**
Citizen −0:0759 −0:0582 −0:0846 −0:0704
0.0379* 0.0249* 0.0284** 0.0237**
Education (years of education) 0.019 0.0157 0.0196 0.0143
0.0025** 0.0024** 0.0027** 0.0025**
Neighborhood attachment −0:0174 −0:0157
0.0052** 0.0051**
Town attachment 0.0069 0.0091
0.0056 0.0062
County attachment −0:0213 −0:0167
0.0051** 0.0043**
Continent attachment 0.0259 0.018
0.0081** 0.0083*
National pride (1) −0:0232 0.002 −0:0045
0.0089** 0.0066 0.0078
National pride (2) −0:0379 −0:0381
0.0042** 0.0042**
National pride (3) −0:0224 −0:0203
0.0051** 0.0068**
National pride (4) −0:0527 −0:0551
0.0044** 0.0046**
Pride in democracy 0.0134 0.0183
0.0061* 0.0053**
Pride in political in uence −0:0311 −0:0172
0.0077** 0.0091+
Economic pride 0.0023 0.0097
0.007 0.0072
Pride in social security system 0.0004 0.0034
0.0072 0.0078
Number of obs 18993 20472 19867 15091
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.12
Notes: The table contains the estimated marginal e ect on the probability of being pro-trade, given an
increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value. The standard
errors of the marginal e ect of each relevant regressor – adjusted for clustering on country – are presented
under eachmarginal e ect. + signi cant at 10%; * signi cant at 5%; ** signi cant at 1%. Pro-Trade Dummy
is coded as follows: Pro-Trade Dummy = 1 if Trade Opinion = 4 or 5; 0 if Trade Opinion = 1;2;3;8, or 9.
See Appendix B, Tables 12 and 13 for de nitions of neighborhood attachment, town attachment, county
attachment, continent attachment, national pride (1) – (4), pride in democracy, pride in political in uence,
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national pride (2) and pro-trade views. This is signi cant in explaining the cross-country
variation in trade attitudes, as national pride (2) varies greatly among countries. 34
At the more explicitly nationalistic end of things, the results are as one would have
expected. Feelings of superiority of one’s own country presumably encourage thoughts
of national isolationism, and abstention from political alliances and other international
economic relations. Individuals who agree with the statement that their country “should
follow its own interests, even if this leads to con icts with other nations” (national
pride (4)) are signi cantly less likely to be pro-trade. 35 These individuals clearly
perceive trade as a zero-sum game. 36
Finally, we turn to pride in speci c national achievements. We focus on the follow-
ing questions: “How proud are you of respondent’s country in eachof th e following?
The way democracy works.” (pride in democracy); Political in uence in world.” (pride
in political in uence); Economic achievements.” (economic pride); Social security sys-
tem.” (pride in social security system). 37 As shown in column (3) of Table 7, pride
in a country’s democracy is positively correlated withpro-trade attitudes. We take th is
to indicate that trade is less threatening to individuals who have con dence in their
country’s political institutions. On the other hand, pride in a country’s political in u-
ence in the world (where the U.S. tops the list) is negatively associated with pro-trade
attributes.
7. Concluding remarks
In Table 8 we present our preferred speci cation, based on the models we have con-
sidered so far. The main constraint in formulating a “summary” model is that missing
values for speci c questions result in a reduction in the sample size as more explana-
tory variables are added. The speci cation in Table 8 represents our compromise. It is
meant to capture the essential insights of all the approaches we have used in explaining
the formation of trade attitudes, with one exception: we have had to exclude regres-
sors that relate to the speci c-factors model, because the sample size would become
unacceptably low otherwise. 38
34 The percentage of respondents that would “rather be citizen of own country than of any other country”
varies from 91% in the U.S. to only 50% in the Netherlands (Table 12 in Appendix B).
35 The percentage of respondents who agree with the proposition that their own country’s interests should
be followed even at the cost of con ict with others ranges from 73% in Bulgaria to 19% in Japan (Table
12 in Appendix B).
36 Where similar questions exist in the WVS, the results are very similar to those reported in the text for
the ISSP data set. We do not present these results with the WVS to save space.
37 As might be expected, levels of pride are generally quite low in the former socialist economies: only
9% of respondents are proud of the economic achievements of their country in Hungary, compared to 83%
in Germany and 82% in the U.S. (Table 13).
38 We tested the robustness of our results to changes in the size of the sample (for example, we estimated
various speci cations in previous tables restricting the sample to observations without missing values for the
regressors in our preferred speci cation (n = 9696)). We don’t  nd substantive di erences relative to our
previous results.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1417
Table 8
Preferred speci cation (ISSP data set)
OLS
12
Without country DV With country DV









Log of real income 0.0872 0.1114
0.0332* 0.0269**
Upper social class 0.1212 0.077
0.0213** 0.0133**
Neighborhood attachment −0:0614 −0:0743
0.0305+ 0.0193**
Town attachment 0.0628 0.0629
0.0211** 0.0206**
County attachment −0:0767 −0:0767
0.0336* 0.0217**
Continent attachment 0.0216 0.048
0.0239 0.0170*
National pride (2) −0:1518 −0:1403
0.0256** 0.0184**
National pride (3) −0:0697 −0:0895
0.0235** 0.0179**




Number of obs 9696 9696
Adj. R2 0.19 0.22
Notes: Standard errors – adjusted for clustering on country – are presented under eachestimated coe cient.
+ signi cant at 10%; * signi cant at 5%; ** signi cant at 1%. See de nitions of the variables at the end
of Tables 4, 6 and 7.
The basic speci cation is shown with and without country dummies. Note that the
inclusion of country dummies does not greatly improve the overall  t of the regression.
(The models in Table 8 are OLS speci cations, so that we can interpret the R2 in the
usual fashion.) Even without the country dummies, our preferred speci cation explains
almost a  fth (19%) of the variation in trade attitudes in our sample. Inclusion of the
country dummies raises the adjusted R2 only to 22%. In view of the complex nature
of the issue at hand and the imperfections of our data, we consider this to be a fair
level of success at explaining attitudes towards trade.1418 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
At the beginning of the paper, we highlighted the important di erences that exist
across countries in average pro-trade orientation. How well does our preferred spec-
i cation do in explaining these cross-country di erences? One way of getting at this
question is to compute the standard deviation of the country dummy variables esti-
mated without controls and, next, with all the variables in our preferred speci cation.
As in Krueger and Summers (1988), we adjust the raw standard deviations, which
are upwardly biased due to sampling variation. 39 We  nd that the adjusted standard
deviation decreases from 0.9642 to 0.6775 when we switch from the speci cation with
no controls (only country dummy variables) to th e speci cation withbotheconomic
and non-economic determinants (regression (2), Table 8). What this indicates is that
our preferred speci cation is fairly successful in explaining average di erences in trade
attitudes across countries.
Consider two speci c cases, Poland and Sweden. In Poland’s case, the average value
of Trade Opinion is 0.90 points lower (on a 5-point scale) than in Germany. 40 What
accounts for the di erence? We can apply the coe cient estimates in column (2)
of Table 8 to country-level averages of the regressors to arrive at an approximate
decomposition. Our results indicate that some 65% of the di erence is explained by
di erences in comparative advantage – i.e., more individuals associate themselves with
skill-based gains from trade in Germany than in Poland – more than 20% by greater
nationalism/patriotism in Poland, and about 6% by the greater incidence of perceptions
of low social status in Poland. In Sweden’s case, the average value of Trade Opinion
is 0.33 points smaller than in Germany. Since the patterns of comparative advantage
and the skill distribution do not di er greatly in these two countries, the bulk (roughly
60%) of the di erence between Germany and Sweden is accounted for by greater
cosmopolitanism in Germany and greater nationalism/patriotism in Sweden.
Non-economic determinants, in the form of socio-demographic background, values,
identities, and attachments, play a very important role in explaining the variation in
attitudes over trade. Using a linear speci cation (as in regression (2), Table 8), if
we  rst consider a model withonly economic variables ( education, education∗gdp,
(log) real income) and dummy variables, and we next introduce the non-economic
variables (age, male, upper social class, neighborhood attachment, town attachment,
county attachment, continent attachment, national pride (2), national pride (3), and
national pride (4)) the increase in the R2 is equal to 0.0667 (from a value of 0.1536).
If we repeat the same steps reversing the order ( rst the non-economic variables plus
dummy variables, next the economic ones), the R2 increases by 0.0218 (from a value
of 0.1985).
To conclude, attitudes to trade are shaped by a complex set of determinants, both
economic and non-economic ones. Values and narrow self-interest bothmatter.
39 We use Krueger and Summers (1988)’s formula SD( ) ≈

var( ˆ  ) −
n
k=1 ˆ  2
k=n, where   are the true
country e ects, ˆ   are the estimated ones, ˆ  2
k is the standard error of ˆ  k and n is the number of countries.
As in Krueger and Summers (1988), we do not adjust for covariance terms.
40 The average values of Trade Opinion are calculated restricting the sample to observations without
missing values for the regressors in our preferred speci cation.A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1419
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Appendix A. Sector classi cation: Description of the reclassi cation procedure
Since in the ISSP survey there is no direct question about industry, we infer sector
of employment from data on occupation. We use individual answers to two questions
in the data set, one asking for occupation according to an international code (the 4-digit
International Standard Classi cation of Occupations (ISCO) from 1968 and from 1988)
and another one asking for occupation in terms of national codes. Individuals in each
country give information about own occupation according to only one of the classi-
 cations (either ISCO 1968 or ISCO 1988 or according to a national classi cation).
In particular, individuals’ occupations from the following countries are coded accord-
ing to ISCO 1968: Germany West, Germany East, USA, Austria, Norway, Bulgaria,
New Zealand, Spain, Slovak Republic. The occupation codes of this group of coun-
tries are recoded all together. Respondents’ occupations from the following countries
are instead coded according to ISCO 1988: Hungary, Ireland, CzechRepublic, Poland,
Slovenia, Canada, Russia, Latvia. Again, we recode the occupation codes of this group
of countries all together. Finally, respondents’ occupations for Great Britain, Sweden,
the Philippines, Italy, Netherlands and Japan follow national occupation codes. Data
from Great Britain, Sweden and the Philippines are recoded individually. The national
occupation codes for Italy, Netherlands and Japan cannot be reclassi ed, since they are
not detailed enough.
We reclassify the occupation variables from the ISSP data set in order to match the
coding in the World Trade Analyzer (WTA) data set, containing world trade  ows
from 1980 to 1997. To classify industries, the WTA uses a slightly modi ed version
of the Standard International Trade Classi cation (SITC), Revision 2. However, in the
WTA CD-ROM, information is also available in a di erent format. Data is organized
according to the 34 manufacturing industry basis used by the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA). This coding is quite similar to the U.S. Standard Industrial
Classi cation. The WTA CD-ROM includes the annual bilateral trade values between
all countries in the world in 1980–1997 according to this 34-industry classi cation. We
use the BEA classi cation to recode the occupation variables in the ISSP data set and
construct a new variable indicating the individual sector of employment. The 34 indus-
tries (plus one – Non-manufacturing – recoded as 35) are listed in Table 9. In order to
obtain a more precise match between the ISSP occupation data and the BEA industry
codes, we base the recoding on a very detailed description of the correspondence be-
tween BEA codes and SITC Revision 2 (four-digit level) codes (we used “Appendix1420 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
Table 9
BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) 34 manufacturing industry codes
1. Grain, Mill and Bakery Products
2. Beverages
3. Tobacco Product
4. Other Food and Kindred Products
5. Apparel and Other Textile Products
6. Leather and Leather Products
7. Pulp, Paper and Board Mills
8. Other Paper and Allied Products
9. Printing and Publishing
10. Drugs
11. Soaps, Cleaners, and Toilet Goods
12. Agricultural Chemicals
13. Industrial Chemicals and Synthetics
14. Other Chemicals
15. Rubber Products
16. Miscellaneous Plastic Products
17. Primary Metal Industries, Ferrous
18. Primary Metal Industries, Nonferrous
19. Fabricated Metal Products
20. Farm and Garden Machinery
21. Construction, Mining, etc.
22. Computer and O ce Equipment
23. Other Nonelectric Machinery
24. Household Appliances
25. Household Audio and Video, etc.
26. Electronic Components
27. Other Electrical Machinery
28. Motor Vehicles and Equipment
29. Other Transportation Equipment
30. Lumber, Wood, Furniture, etc.
31. Glass Products
32. Stone, Clay, Concrete, Gypsum, etc.
33. Instruments and Apparatus
34. Other Manufacturing
35. Non-Manufacturing (natural resources, etc.)
D: SITC Revision 2 codes used by Statistics Canada, WTA, and the corresponding
BEA 34 manufacturing industry codes”, from “World Trade Flows, 1980–1997”, by
Feenstra (2000)).
In addition to the 35 BEA industry codes, we create new codes as combinations of
the original 35 codes. This is necessary since the occupation codes used in the ISSP
data set are not always detailed enoughto be match ed to any single BEA code. See an
extract from the 1968 ISCO classi cation in Table 10 and corresponding BEA codes,
assigned by us, as an example of the reclassi cation.
For eachof th e 35 original BEA industries, we consider sector-speci c exports
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(imports) of the sectors used in the combination (so, for example, exports of sector
36, which is the combination of sectors 17 and 18, are set equal to the sum of ex-
ports of sectors 17 and 18). We then average both exports and imports over the years
1990–1995.
Table 10
Extract from 1968 International Standard Classi cation of Occupations
1968 ISCO BEA code
Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers,  shermen and hunters
60 Farm managers and supervisors
6000 Farm managers and supervisors 1, 4
6001 Farm managers and supervisors (general) 1, 4
6009 Farm managers 1, 4
61 Farmers
6100 Farmers 1, 4
6110 General farmers 1, 4
6112 General farmers (general) 1, 4
6115 Collective farmers 1, 4
6120 Specialised farmers 1, 4
62 Agricultural and animal husbandry workers
6200 Agricultural and animal husbandry worker 1, 4
6210 General farm workers 1, 4
6211 Farm helpers (general) 1, 4
6219 Farm hand 1, 4
6220 Field crop and vegetable farm workers 1, 4
6230 Orchard, vineyard and related tree and shrub crop workers 4
6240 Livestock workers 4
6250 Dairy farm workers 4
6260 Poultry farm workers 4
6270 Nursery workers and gardeners 4
6280 Farm machinery operators 1, 4
6290 Agricultural and animal husbandry workers, n.e.c. 1, 4
63 Forestry workers
6300 Forestry workers 30
6310 Loggers 30
6319 Logger 30
6320 Forestry workers (except logging) NT
64 Fishermen, hunters and related workers
6400 Fishermen, hunters and related workers 4
6410 Fishermen 4
6490 Fishermen, hunters and related workers, n.e.c. 4
Production and related workers, transport equipment operators and labourers
70 Production supervisors and general foremen
7000 Production supervisors and general foremen m.v.
7001 Production supervisors and general foremen (general) m.v.1422 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
Table 10 (Continued)
1968 ISCO BEA code
71 Miners, quarrymen, well drillers and related workers
7100 Miners, quarrymen, well drillers 35
7110 Miners and quarrymen 35
7111 Quarrymen (general) 35
7112 Cutting machine operators (mine) 35
7119 Miners and related workers n.e.c. 35
7120 Mineral and stone treaters 35
7130 Well drillers, borers and related workers 35
72 Metal processors
7200 Metal processors 17,18
7210 Metal smelting, converting and re ning furnacemen 17,18
7220 Metal rolling-mill workers 17,18
7230 Metal melters and reheaters 17,18
7240 Metal casters 17,18
7250 Metal moulders and coremakers 17,18
7260 Metal annealers, temperers and case-hardeners 17,18
7270 Metal drawers and extruders 17,18
7280 Metal platers and coaters 17,18
7290 Metal processers, n.e.c. 17,18
73 Wood preparation workers and paper makers
7300 Wood preparation workers 30
7310 Wood treaters 30
7320 Sawyers, plywood makers and related wood-processing workers 30
7321 Sawmill sawyers (general) 30
7330 Paper pulp preparers 7
7340 Paper makers 7
74 Chemical processers and related workers
7400 Chemical processers and related workers 13
7410 Crushers, grinders and mixers 13
7420 Cookers, roasters and related heat-treaters 13
7430 Filter and separator operators 13
7440 Still and reactor operators 13
7450 Petroleum-re ning workers 13
7490 Chemical processers and related workers, n.e.c. 13
75 Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers
7500 Spinners, weavers and related workers 5
7510 Fibre preparers 5
7520 Spinners and winders 5
7530 Weaving- and knitting-machine setters and pattern-card preparers 5
7540 Weavers and related workers 5
7550 Knitters 5
7560 Bleachers, dyers and textile product  nishers 5
7590 Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers, n.e.c. 5
76 Tanners, fellmongers and pelt dressers
7600 Tanners, fellmongers and pelt dressers 6
7610 Tanners and fellmongers 6
7620 Pelt dressers 6A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1423
Table 10 (continued)
1968 ISCO BEA code
77 Food and beverage processers
7700 Food and beverage processers 2,4
7710 Grain millers 1
7720 Sugar processers and re ners 4
7730 Butchers and meat preparers 4
7740 Food preservers 4
7750 Dairy product processors 4
7760 Bakers, pastrycooks and confectionery makers 4
7770 Tea, co ee and cocoa preparers 2
7780 Brewers, wine and beverage makers 2
7790 Food and beverage processers, n.e.c. 2
78 Tobacco preparers and tobacco product makers
7810 Tobacco preparers 3
7820 Cigar makers 3
7830 Cigarette makers 3
7890 Tobacco preparers and tobacco product makers, n.e.c. 3
79 Tailors, dressmakers, sewers, upholsterers and related workers
7900 Tailors, dressmakers, sewers and rel. workers 5
7910 Tailors and dressmakers 5
7919 Tailor 5
7920 Fur tailors and related workers 5
7930 Milliners and hatmakers 5
7940 Patternmakers and cutters 5
7950 Sewers and embroiderers 5
7960 Upholsterers and related workers 5
7990 Tailors, dressmakers, sewers, upholsterers and related workers, n.e.c. 5
80 Shoemakers and leather goods makers
8000 Shoemakers and leather good makers 6
8010 Shoemakers and shoe repairers 6
8020 Shoe cutters, lasters, sewers and related workers 6
8030 Leather goods makers 6
81 Cabinetmakers and related woodworkers
8100 Cabinetmakers and related woodworkers 30
8110 Cabinetmakers 30
8120 Woodworking-machine operators 30
8190 Cabinetmakers and related woodworkers, n.e.c. 30
82 Stone cutters and carvers
8200 Stone cutters and carvers 32
Appendix B































































Demographic variables (ISSP data set)
Country Number of Age Average Male Rural Trade Upper social class Political a liation with the right
observations years of union
in the education member- Lower Working Lower Middle Upper Upper Far Centre Centre Right Far
sample ship middle middle left left right
Germany West 1282 46 10.93 0.54 — 0.36 2.03 0.00 16.15 56.40 16.54 1.25 0.31 48.99 5.46 35.96 2.57
Germany East 612 48 10.93 0.50 — 0.78 8.99 0.00 33.50 43.14 4.25 0.33 15.20 43.46 5.07 25.49 1.31
Great Britain 1058 47 11.34 0.40 — 0.21 — — — — — — 0.57 42.91 14.56 26.28 0.00
USA 1367 45 13.43 0.44 1.59 0.10 5.85 45.79 0.00 44.33 0.00 3.29 0.00 34.31 36.06 27.65 0.00
Austria 1007 46 10.39 0.45 — 0.46 3.67 0.00 15.49 61.77 12.51 0.79 0.00 36.15 4.47 29.89 0.00
Hungary 1000 48 10.50 0.43 1.97 0.15 12.70 35.20 25.30 22.20 1.20 0.00 — — — — —
Italy 1094 43 11.03 0.48 1.98 0.12 1.37 0.00 11.52 71.30 13.35 2.47 — — — — —
Ireland 994 46 12.26 0.49 2.02 0.26 1.61 35.31 14.29 38.73 4.33 0.50 0.00 2.41 35.41 0.91 0.00
Netherlands 2089 44 12.69 0.46 1.72 0.21 — — — — — — 6.46 18.00 25.99 15.65 2.73
Norway 1527 43 12.68 0.50 2.09 0.44 0.00 30.39 6.48 39.49 8.32 0.52 0.65 38.11 18.60 19.71 0.00
Sweden 1296 45 11.43 0.49 1.23 0.71 2.39 35.19 0.00 45.06 9.18 0.69 5.79 33.33 13.97 17.98 0.00
CzechRepublic 1111 43 12.91 0.51 1.65 0.21 4.14 27.27 21.24 35.01 6.39 1.26 5.13 10.80 39.33 22.59 9.00
Slovenia 1036 43 10.68 0.44 2.03 0.35 3.28 34.07 0.00 47.49 6.18 0.19 0.00 4.54 9.56 17.37 1.93
Poland 1598 47 10.29 0.45 1.72 0.13 7.38 41.24 0.00 39.55 4.44 2.19 0.00 24.16 9.26 4.69 0.00
Bulgaria 1105 49 — 0.48 1.92 0.19 14.57 51.67 0.00 26.24 0.00 1.00 5.97 15.02 8.05 8.96 2.71
Russia 1585 45 11.19 0.45 1.50 0.32 12.81 29.72 14.64 25.11 2.90 0.69 18.30 3.15 8.08 35.84 4.35
New Zealand 1043 46 14.33 0.47 1.50 0.15 3.36 18.98 10.64 40.94 11.79 0.96 0.00 4.22 55.23 4.89 0.00
Canada 1543 42 14.78 0.49 1.16 0.20 2.59 16.40 10.17 31.82 13.09 1.49 0.91 20.03 30.07 14.58 0.00
Philippines 1200 40 9.38 0.50 1.75 0.01 25.08 61.33 0.00 10.83 0.00 2.75 — — — — —
Japan 1256 46 11.87 0.46 — 0.13 4.46 0.00 19.27 48.65 17.20 3.50 1.67 5.18 6.21 24.12 0.00
Spain 1221 45 10.13 0.48 1.48 0.08 6.14 41.28 17.61 28.75 3.77 0.33 11.47 31.37 0.25 28.58 0.00
Latvia 1044 47 11.64 0.39 0.39 0.19 11.88 43.30 20.98 0.00 9.77 0.57 — — — — —
Slovak Republic 1388 41 11.83 0.48 — 0.32 8.65 30.98 21.97 26.59 6.63 1.66 4.90 13.18 35.81 12.68 6.41
Mean 28,456 44.77 11.69 0.47 1.69 0.31 7.29 30.77 12.45 40.15 7.90 1.44 6.07 33.16 28.97 29.28 2.52
Standard Deviation 16.88 3.58 0.50 0.90 0.46
Rural is coded as follows: 1 urban, 2 suburbs/city-town, 3 rural.
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 otherwise (i.e., 0 includes m.v.).
Trade Union Membership is coded as follows: 1 member, 0 otherwise (i.e., 0 includes m.v.).
































































Attachment to own neighborhood, town/city and county/region and national pride variables (ISSP data set)
Country % in eachnation declaring
Attachment Attachment Attachment Attachment “rather be Own country In favor of
to own to own to own to own citizen of own better than country’s interests
neighborhood town/city county/region country country” others at any cost
(neighborhood (town (country (national (national (national (national
attachment) attachment) attachment) pride (1)) pride (2)) pride (3)) pride (4))
Germany 0.74 12 0.72 7 0.68 7 0.80 4 0.69 3 0.37 8 0.29 5
Great Britain 0.64 3 0.56 1 0.51 2 0.71 2 0.73 8 0.56 13 0.52 16
USA 0.57 2 0.60 2 0.62 4 0.81 5 0.91 22 0.81 21 0.44 13
Austria 0.83 16 0.84 16 0.89 20 0.91 13 0.86 15 0.69 17 0.62 20
Hungary 0.80 14 0.84 15 0.86 18 0.96 22 0.87 17 0.26 3 0.41 10
Italy 0.68 8 0.82 12 0.80 16 0.87 10 0.62 2 0.37 7 0.30 6
Ireland 0.84 17 0.83 14 0.81 17 0.93 15 0.86 16 0.71 18 0.63 21
Netherlands 0.71 10 0.71 5 0.49 1 0.87 9 0.50 1 0.46 11 0.28 4
Norway 0.51 1 0.70 4 0.79 15 0.94 20 0.78 11 0.67 16 0.38 9
Sweden 0.65 4 0.66 3 0.66 6 0.83 7 0.70 5 0.48 12 0.44 12
CzechRepublic 0.81 15 0.87 19 0.69 9 0.92 14 0.73 7 0.22 1 0.31 7
Slovenia 0.77 13 0.82 13 0.78 14 0.93 17 0.78 13 0.28 4 0.28 3
Poland 0.73 11 0.75 9 0.64 5 0.94 19 0.88 19 0.39 9 0.48 15
Bulgaria 0.88 21 0.89 21 0.86 19 0.93 16 0.88 20 0.57 14 0.73 22
Russia 0.67 6 0.72 6 0.62 3 0.82 6 0.75 9 0.42 10 0.61 19
New Zealand 0.65 5 0.76 10 0.71 11 0.94 18 0.81 14 0.78 20 0.52 17
Canada 0.69 9 0.76 11 0.74 13 0.74 3 0.78 12 0.77 19 0.43 11
Philippines 0.86 19 0.73 8 0.68 8 0.68 1 0.88 18 0.59 15 0.37 8
Japan 0.91 22 0.88 20 0.89 21 0.95 21 0.89 21 0.84 22 0.19 1
Spain 0.88 20 0.92 22 0.90 22 0.89 12 0.73 6 0.36 6 0.61 18
Latvia 0.68 7 0.85 18 0.69 10 0.86 8 0.76 10 0.32 5 0.44 14
Slovak Republic 0.84 18 0.85 17 0.73 12 0.89 11 0.69 4 0.23 2 0.23 2
Mean 0.74 0.78 0.73 0.87 0.78 0.51 0.43































































Notes: The second column of each variable gives the ranking of countries according to that variable. Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest
values. Neighborhood attachment gives responses to the following question: “How close do you feel to (respondent’s neighbourhood)?” Town attachment
gives responses to the following question: “How close do you feel to (respondent’s town/city)?” County attachment gives responses to the following question:
“How close do you feel to (respondent’s county)?” National pride (1) gives responses to the following question: “How close do you feel to (respondent’s
country)?”. National pride (2) gives responses to the question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? I would rather be a
citizen of (respondent’s country) than of any other country in the world.” National pride (3) gives responses to the question: “How much do you agree or
disagree with the following statements? Generally (respondent’s country) is a better country than most other countries.” National pride (4) gives responses to
the question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (respondent’s country) should follow its own interests, even if this leads to
con icts withoth er nations.”A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1427
Table 13
Pride in speci c achievements (ISSP data set)
Country % in eachnation declaring
Proud of Proud of political Proud Proud of
national in uence of economic social security
democracy in the world achievements system
Germany 0.57 12 0.61 16 0.83 22 0.62 17
Great Britain 0.68 15 0.55 15 0.44 12 0.48 12
USA 0.83 20 0.80 22 0.82 19 0.50 13
Austria 0.71 16 0.63 17 0.82 21 0.84 22
Hungary 0.20 1 0.18 1 0.09 1 0.07 1
Italy 0.26 6 0.23 3 0.40 9 0.28 8
Ireland 0.75 18 0.79 21 0.82 20 0.65 19
Netherlands 0.84 21 0.49 13 0.78 16 0.83 21
Norway 0.80 19 0.78 19 0.80 18 0.62 16
Sweden 0.64 13 0.41 11 0.17 3 0.65 18
CzechRepublic 0.35 8 0.51 14 0.42 11 0.19 6
Slovenia 0.21 3 0.29 4 0.34 8 0.30 9
Poland 0.24 5 0.36 6 0.28 6 0.17 4
Bulgaria 0.31 7 0.36 7 0.26 5 0.18 5
Russia 0.20 1 0.32 5 0.16 2 0.08 2
New Zealand 0.73 17 0.71 18 0.72 15 0.39 10
Canada 0.84 22 0.79 20 0.62 14 0.81 20
Philippines 0.53 10 0.39 9 0.50 13 0.52 14
Japan 0.66 14 0.45 12 0.80 17 0.47 11
Spain 0.54 11 0.40 10 0.41 10 0.53 15
Latvia 0.40 9 0.38 8 0.21 4 0.12 3
Slovak Republic 0.22 4 0.19 2 0.31 7 0.22 7
Mean 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.43
Standard deviation 0.24 0.20 0.26 0.25
Notes: The second column of each variable gives the ranking of countries according to that variable.
Bold numbers correspond to highest and lowest values. Pride in democracy answers the following question::
“How proud are you of (respondent’s country) in each of the following? The way democracy works.” Pride
in political in uence answers the following question: : “How proud are you of (respondent’s country) in
eachof th e following? Political in uence in world.” Economic pride answers the following question: : “How
proud are you of (respondent’s country) in each of the following? Economic achievements.” Pride in social
security system answers the following question: : “How proud are you of (respondent’s country) in each of
the following? Social security system.”
Table 14
Per capita GDP of the countries in the ISSP and WVS samples







Armenia 1938.330 7.5701428 A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430
Table 14 (continued)






















































Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM (World Bank).A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik/European Economic Review 49 (2005) 1393–1430 1429
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